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Abstract
Security is one of the main challenges of service oriented computing. Services
need to be loosely coupled, easily accessible and yet provide tight security
guarantees enforced by cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we address
how to automatically synthesize an orchestrator process able to guarantee
the secure composition of electronic services, supporting different communi-
cation and cryptographic protocols. We present a theoretical model based
on process algebra, partial model checking and logical satisfiability, plus an
automated tool implementing the proposed theory.
Keywords: Synthesis of Functional and Secure Processes, Secure Service
Composition, Partial Model Checking, Process Algebras, Temporal Logic.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Security concerns over Web services are regarded as a major research chal-
lenge for service oriented computing. The loose coupling of services, which
enables higher reuse and interoperability, is often constrained by their secu-
rity requirements. This fact complicates orchestration, that is, the design of
an entity which coordinates some services in order to achieve a higher goal
from their composition. In this paper, we address how to automatically syn-
thesize an orchestrator for composing services with incompatible signature,
behaviour and cryptographic capabilities. In particular, we deal with the
problem of how to assure that the global service obtained by composition
of the orchestrator, and the services, satisfies both functional and security
requirements.
We introduce a didactic example illustrating the aforementioned chal-
lenge. Consider an user willing to purchase both an airplane ticket and an
insurance contract covering the trip. As expected in the service-oriented ap-
proach, we suppose that this is achieved by the orchestration of a booking
service and an insurance service. The booking service is represented by a
process accepting some cryptographic material from the user, such as an en-
cryption key, and the proof of a successful payment transaction signed with
the received key. After such a request, the booking service issues a ticket,
which is then sent encrypted to the insurance service for further processing.
The insurance service receives the encrypted ticket, and returns an insured
version of it. The procedure ends correctly once the insured version of the
ticket is generated. From a security point of view, it is important to protect
the ticket from malicious users willing to discover its content (e.g., pairing
the user name with the destination could represent a privacy violation, ac-
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cording to some requirements of the owner; or the ticket could be anonymous,
and the attacker use it in place of the legitimate owner).
There are some communication issues in this apparently simple procedure.
For example, the user might be unable to manage both operations by himself,
for some reason that is immaterial here. Furthermore, the two services might
not be able to communicate directly, due to firewalls, mismatching policies,
or incompatibilities in their interfaces. In this case, one needs to synthesize a
third service, called hereafter orchestrator, whose aim is to make the system
functional, i.e., fully satisfying its goal (request and successfully obtain both
a ticket and the correspondent insurance). The correct execution of the whole
procedure is guaranteed by the issuance and proper reception of the insured
ticket. In the process, one should also care about some security properties (in
our case, the secrecy of the issued ticket). Thus, the orchestrator must not
only be “functional”, but also “secure”, since its functionality should obey
to the security requirements imposed on the composed system.
In this paper, we present a theoretical model and an automated tool
for the synthesis and verification of service orchestrators which are both
functionally correct and secure.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recalls the Crypto-CCS
language used to describe cryptographic services. In Section 3, we present
the theoretical framework used to synthesize cryptographic orchestrators.
Section 4 describes a tool implementing the proposed theory and shows an
example analysis. Section 5 recalls related work in the area. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper.
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Chapter 2
Languages for crypto-services
In this section, we recall the Crypto-CCS process calculus [8] used here for
specifying cryptographic services, i.e., services that are able to perform cryp-
tographic primitives, such as encryption and decryption. We also present a
variant of the logic language in [8], used to express properties of services.
2.1 Crypto-CCS
We define those parts of the syntax and semantics of Crypto-CCS needed in
the sequel of this paper.
Crypto-CCS is a slightly modified version of CCS [11], including some
cryptographic primitives. A model defined in Crypto-CCS consists of a set
of sequential agents able to communicate by exchanging messages (e.g., data
manipulated by the agents). Inference systems model the possible operations
on messages and therefore consist of a set of rules of the form:
r =
m1 · · · mn
m0
where m1, . . . ,mn form a set of premises (possibly empty) and m0 is the
conclusion. An instance of the application of a rule r to closed messages
m1, . . . ,mn (i.e., messages without variables) is denoted as m1 · · · mn `r
m0.
The control part of the language consists of compound systems, basi-
cally sequential agents running in parallel. The terms of the language are
generated by the following grammar (only constructs used in the sequel are
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presented):
S:= S1 ‖ S2 | S\L | Aφ compound systems
A:= 0 | p.A | [m1 · · ·mn `r x]A;A1 sequential agents
p:= c!m | c?x prefix constructs
where m1, . . . ,mn,m are closed messages or variables, x is a variable and c
is an element of the finite set Ch of channels. Informally, the Crypto-CCS
semantics used in the sequel are:
• c!m denotes a message m sent over channel c;
• c?x denotes a message m received over channel c which replaces the
variable x;
• 0 denotes a process that does nothing;
• p.A denotes a process that can perform an action according to p and
then behave as A;
• [m1 · · ·mn `r x]A;A1 denotes the inference construct: if (by applying
an instance of rule r with premises m1, . . . ,mn) a message m can be
inferred, then the process behaves as A (where m replaces x), otherwise
it behaves as A1. This is the message manipulating construct of the
language;
• S1 ‖ S2 denotes the parallel composition of S1 and S2, i.e. S1 ‖ S2
performs an action if either S1 or S2 does. It may perform a syn-
chronization or internal action, denoted by τ , whenever S1 and S2 can
perform two complementary send and receive actions over the same
channel.
• S\L is prevented to perform actions whose channels belong to the set
L, except for synchronization.
• Aφ is a single sequential agent whose knowledge is described by φ.
The language is completely parametric with respect to the inference sys-
tem used. In particular, an example inference system to model asymmetric
encryption is shown below. We denote with y a key belonging to an asym-
metric pair of keys, we denote as y−1 the correspondent complementary key.
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If y is used for encryption, then y−1 is used for decryption, and vice versa.
Given a set of messages φ, then message m ∈ D(φ) if and only if m can be
deduced from the rules of the following inference system (modelling public
key cryptography):
x y
E(x, y)
(enc)
E(x, y) y−1
x (dec)
2.2 Specification example
Consider the example of the booking and insurance services that we pro-
vided in the introduction. We give here the Crypto-CCS specification of the
actors, namely a user U , the booking service BS, and the insurance service
InS. Each process is parametrized by the cryptographic keys it has in its
knowledge, since the beginning of the computation.
U(ku, k
−1
u , kbook)
.
=
[ku kbook `enc E(ku, kbook)] encrypt user key,
a!E(ku, kbook). send encrypted user key,
[money k−1u `enc E(money, k−1u )] encrypt money,
a!E(money, k−1u ).0 send encrypted money and stop
BS(k−1book)
.
=
b?Enc KU . receive an encrypted key,
[Enc KU k
−1
book `dec KU ] decrypt with k−1book,
b?Enc Money. receive encrypted money,
[Enc Money KU `dec Money] decrypt with KU ,
[ticket KU `enc E(ticket,KU)] encrypt ticket with KU ,
b!E(ticket,KU).0 send encrypted ticket and stop
InS(k−1ins)
.
=
c?Enc T icket. receive an encrypted ticket,
[Enc T icket k−1ins `dec Ticket] decrypt with k−1ins,
c!insuredt.0 send insured ticket and stop
Keys ku, k
−1
u form a pair of asymmetric keys related to the user. The
user requests a ticket and the corresponding insured ticket. Key k−1u is the
private key of the user. Indeed, to decrypt messages encrypted with k−1u ,
one must know ku. Key pair kbook, k
−1
book is used by the booking service to
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perform some operations leading to the ticket issuance. Whereas kbook is
public, and known also by the user, the correspondent k−1book is only known
to the booking Service. Key k−1ins is the private key of the insurance service.
Variables Enc KU , Enc Money , and Enc T icket contain, respectively, an
encrypted key, an encrypted payment, and an encrypted ticket. Money and
Ticket contain the decrypted payment and ticket. Messages money, ticket
and insuredt represent the actual payment, ticket, and insured ticket.
The user initiates the procedure by sending two messages: ku, encrypted
with the public key of the booking service kbook, and the payment for buying
the airplane ticket. The payment is encrypted using the private key k−1u .
The booking service is a process ready to receive an encrypted key, de-
crypt it with its own private key k−1book, receive the encrypted payment, de-
crypt it with the previously received key, and produce a ticket. The booking
service sends the encrypted version of the ticket and terminates.
Finally, the insurance service is a process that receives an encrypted
ticket, tries to decrypt it with private key k−1ins, and sends an insured ver-
sion of the ticket.
The three processes act in parallel, thus the full system specification is
S
.
= U ‖ BS ‖ InS. Note that processes cannot directly communicate with
each other, but rather they have to interact with the orchestrator. Indeed,
U dialogues on channel a, BS on channel b, while InS on channel c. Also,
whereas the booking service encrypts the ticket with ku, the insurance service
would expect to decrypt the same ticket with decryption key k−1ins.
Later we will see how to synthesize an orchestrator allowing these services
to communicate, obtaining a composite system that is functional and secure.
2.3 A logic language for properties of services
In order to specify some properties of a composed service, we exploit a logical
language LK originally presented in [8]. The language is an extension of
multi-modal logic (see, e.g., [12]) with operators for specifying whether a
message belongs to the knowledge of an agent after some computation γ.
Here, γ is a sequence of actions performed by the whole system. The syntax
of the logical language LK is defined by the following grammar:
F ::= T|F|〈a〉F |[a]F | ∧i∈I Fi | ∨i∈IFi |m ∈ KφA,γ |
m 6∈ KφA,γ | ∀γ : K1, . . . , Kn
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Table 2.1: Semantics of LK .
S |= T, for every process S
S |= F, for no process S
S |= ∧i∈IFi iff ∀i ∈ I : S |= Fi
S |= ∨i∈IFi iff ∃i ∈ I : S |= Fi
S |= 〈a〉F iff ∃S ′ : S a−→ S ′ and S ′ |= F
S |= [a]F iff ∀S ′ : S a−→ S ′ implies S ′ |= F
S |= m ∈ KφA,γ iff ∀S ′ : s.t.(S
γ7→ S ′) ↓A= γ′ and S ′ 6 a−→
then m ∈ D(φ ∪msgs(γ′))
S |= m 6∈ KφA,γ iff ∀S ′ : s.t.(S
γ7→ S ′) ↓A= γ′ and S ′ 6 a−→
then m 6∈ D(φ ∪msgs(γ′))
S |= ∀γ : K1, . . . , Kn iff ∀i=1,...,n S |= Ki
where a ∈ Act, m is a closed message, A is an agent identifier, φ a finite
set of closed messages, and Ki, for i in some index set I, is of the kind
m ∈ KφA,γ or m 6∈ KφA,γ.
We briefly explain the syntax. T and F are the true and false logical
constants. 〈a〉F is a modality expressing the possibility to perform an action
a and then satisfy F . The modality [a]F expresses the necessity that, after
performing an action a, the system satisfies F . ∨i∈I (∧i∈I) represents logical
disjunction (conjunction). A system S satisfies a formula m ∈ KφA,γ (resp.,
m /∈ KφA,γ) if S can perform a computation γ of actions and an agent of S,
identified by A, can (resp., cannot) infer the message m starting from the set
of messages φ plus the messages it has come to know during the computation
γ. The formula ∀γ : K1, . . . , Kn is satisfied by a system S if and only if S
satisfies each formula of the kind ∀γ : m ∈ (resp., /∈) Kφi,A,γ with i = 1, . . . , n;
such base case is satisfied by a system S if for all computation γ, an agent A
of S can (resp., cannot) infer m during γ starting from the set of messages
φ.
Let S
γ7→ S ′ denote the transition of a compound system S to S ′ through
the sequence of actions γ. Then, we denote with (S
γ7→ S ′) ↓A the sequence
of actions performed by agent A in S, contributing to the transition S
γ7→ S ′.
Table 2.1 shows the formal semantics of a formula F ∈ LK .
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Chapter 3
The synthesis approach
We now proceed to extend some results in the area of partial model check-
ing, logic languages and satisfiability, in order to synthesize an orchestrator
process able to i) combine several services and provide an unified interface
that satisfies a client request and ii) guarantee that the composite service is
secure. Hereafter, from a functional perspective, we concentrate on the dead-
lock freedom and livelock freedom properties, and from a security perspective,
we concentrate on the secrecy property.
Let us consider finite services. We assume that each service in the com-
position is not able to communicate with the others, i.e., the set of channels
over which Si is able to communicate does not intersect the set of channels
over which Sj is able to communicate, for each pair Si Sj in S.
The functional property of deadlock/livelock freedom is expressed by the
formula ∀γ(max) mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max), where γ(max) is the maximal length
execution trace of S, mF is a special final message, signalling that the services
in S successfully terminate their execution (i.e., no deadlock or livelock has
happened). For the sake of modelling, we assume that: 1) if mF falls into
the orchestrator’s knowledge φO, then the services in S have successfully
terminated their execution; 2) if mF does not fall into the orchestrator’s
knowledge after a number ns of transitions performed by the orchestrator,
then at least one service in S has not successfully terminated its execution.
In particular, ns is defined according to the size of S, and it represents the
maximal size of the orchestrator.
The secrecy property is expressed by the formula
∀γ m /∈ KφXX,γ, where X is the identifier of an intruder. This means that
message m, that should remain a secret, will not fall into the intruder’s
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knowledge φX .
Let us consider the process (S‖OφO‖XφX ) \ L. No matter what the be-
haviour of X is, we require that this process satisfies both formulas. It is
worth noticing that in this case there are two components whose behaviour
is unknown: the orchestrator O and the intruder X.
One issue is to decide if there exists an orchestrator O such that, for
all the possible behaviours of X, after the computation of maximal length
γ(max), mF is in the knowledge of O and m is not in the knowledge of X.
(3.1)
∃OφO s.t. ∀XφX (S‖OφO‖XφX ) \ L |=
∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max),m /∈ KφXX,γ(max)
In the above expression, we only consider maximal behaviours γ(max)
as the knowledge of the agents is incremental: if an agent does not know m
after a computation of maximal length, then it is safe to assume that m was
not known at any point in time during the computation.
Another important aspect is how to automatically synthesize the orches-
trator. We can use partial model checking [2] to simplify expression 3.1 by
partially evaluating the formula ∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max),m /∈ KφXX,γ(max).
Partial evaluation is done with respect to some known part of the system.
In our case, the known part is the behaviour of S. The derived formula is
denoted as {. . .}//ns,S. Table 3.1 shows the partial evaluation function for
Formula 3.1.
Proposition 3.0.1 Let S be a system and OφO and XφX two sequential
agents, where φO and φX are finite set representing the knowledge of O and
X. Let Sort(S‖X) ⊆ L be the set of channels on which S and X can com-
municate. If mi i = 1, . . . , n, are secret messages and mF is the final one,
we have:
(S‖OφO‖XφX ) \ L |=
∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max),mi /∈ KφXX,γ(max)
iff
OφO‖XφX |=
(∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max),mi /∈ KφXX,γ(max))//ns,S
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Table 3.1: Partial evaluation function for ∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max),mi /∈
KφXX,γ(max).
∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max),mi /∈ KφXX,γ(max)//ns,S(with S
a−→) .=∧
(c,m′,S′)∈SendO(S) [c!m
′](∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max),mi /∈ KφXX,γ(max)//ns−1,S′) (sendingO) ∧∧
(c,m′,S′)∈SendX(S) [c!m
′](∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max),mi /∈ KφXX,γ(max)//ns,S′) (sendingX) ∧∧
S
c!m′−→S′ [c?m
′](∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφO∪{m
′}
O,γ(max),mi /∈ KφXX,γ(max)//ns−1,S′) (receivingO) ∧∧
S
c!m′−→S′ [c?m
′](∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max),mi /∈ KφX∪{m
′}
X,γ(max)//ns,S′) (receivingX) ∧∧
(c,m′)∈SendOX [τc!m′ ](∀γ(max) : mF ∈ K
φO
O,γ(max),m /∈ KφX∪{m
′}
X,γ(max)//ns−1,S) (synchroOX) ∧∧
(c,m′)∈SendXO [τc!m′ ](∀γ(max) : mF ∈ K
φO∪{m′}
O,γ(max),mi /∈ KφXX,γ(max)//ns−1,S) (synchroXO) ∧∧
S
a−→S′(a=τ) ∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max),mi /∈ KφXX,γ(max)//ns,S′ (idling)
∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max),mi /∈ KφXX,γ(max)//0,S (with S 6
a−→) .= mF ∈ KφOO,,m /∈ KφXX,
where :
SendO(S) = {(c,m′, S′)|S c?m
′
−→ S′ and m′ ∈ D(φO)}&
SendX(S) = {(c,m′, S′)|S c?m
′
−→ S′ and m′ ∈ D(φX)}&
SendOX = {(c,m′)|m′ ∈ D(φO)}&
SendXO = {(c,m′)|m′ ∈ D(φX)}&
This result identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions that the orches-
trator, interacting with every possible X, must satisfy in order to guarantee
that the final message mF is delivered correctly, i.e., mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max), with-
out any disclosure of information to X, i.e., mi /∈ KφXX,γ(max).
However, the presence of the universal quantifier on X makes the formula
∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max) not satisfiable, since X can always interfere with
the normal execution of S getting the overall system stuck, so that the final
message mF is not delivered.
However, still keeping the intuition behind Formula 3.1, we can weaken
the property to the conjunction of Formulas A1 and A2, where:
A1 When there is not an intruder, the orchestrator always drives the services
to correct termination.
A2 When there is an intruder, no matter what actions it takes, it is not able
to learn the secret m.
Now we need to determine whether it is possible to determine an orchestrator
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O satisfying this weaker assumption. Decidability comes from the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.0.2 Given a system S, and two finite sets φO and φX , it is
decidable if ∃OφO s.t. ∀XφX
A1 (S‖OφO) \ L |= ∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max)
A2 (S‖OφO‖XφX ) \ L |= ∀γ(max) : m /∈ KφXX,γ(max)
In A1, we are assuming that the attacker X is the empty process, with
an empty initial knowledge φX .
According to Proposition 3.0.1, we can apply the partial model checking
techniques to A1 and A2 obtaining:
A1′ OφO |= (∀γ(max) : mF ∈ KφOO,γ(max))//ns,S
A2′ (OφO‖Xφ) |= (∀γ(max) : m /∈ KφXX,γ(max))//ns,S
Hence, since the formulas in A1 and A2 are finite, the application of the
partial model checking, in conjunction with the usage of some satisfiabil-
ity procedure for process algebra (see e.g., [13]), allows us to synthesize an
orchestrator, whenever it exists. We shall see an example in Section 4.1.
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Chapter 4
PaMoChSA 2012: Tool
description
The two formulas of Proposition 3.0.2 have been implemented [1] as an exten-
sion of the PaMoChSA tool, the PArtial MOdel CHecker Security Analyser,
see [10]. The original tool implemented a partial model-checking solution to
the problem of finding an attack in a security protocol. The techniques in the
current paper extend the approach to address the problem of synthesizing a
secure orchestrator.
The algorithm enumerates all secure orchestrators. Besides being an im-
plementation of the formulas in Proposition 3.0.2, the algorithm can be more
intuitively explained as path-finding in a state graph. In principle, the be-
haviour of an orchestrator is a tree. However, since the system and the
orchestrator are assumed to be deterministic, such a tree has an equivalent
description in terms of all its paths.
Nodes of the graph are triples (s,KO, KX) where s is the current contin-
uation of the system specification (initially, the system specification itself);
KO is the knowledge of the orchestrator; and KX is the knowledge of the
intruder.
The initial values for s, KO and KX are user-specified, as well as a set of
channels H that are considered secure against intrusion (therefore, messages
sent on these channels can neither be eavesdropped nor manipulated).
Arcs of the graph are the possible steps that an orchestrator can do, that
is, communications on channels that are shared with the system. An arc
has a source (s,KO, KX) and a target (s
′, K ′O, K
′
X). In principle, the target
s′ should be the continuation of s after that some communication has been
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performed. The knowledge of the orchestrator KO should accordingly be
updated, in order to reflect the messages acquired from s (in case s can send
messages to the orchestrator). Paths formed by such transitions obey to the
requirement A1 in Proposition 3.0.2. However, also the requirement A2 has
to be kept into account.
A practical way to account for possible attacks is to build the state graph
in such a way that additional transitions are present, simulating eavesdrop-
ping and manipulation of messages by the intruder (with the exception of
communications happening on channels in H). Thus, whenever s can receive
a message of type T from the orchestrator, the continuation s′ can also be
instantiated with all messages of the same type that can be deduced from
the knowledge of the intruder KX . Likewise, whenever s can send a message
to the orchestrator, the knowledge K ′O of the orchestrator can also be aug-
mented with all the messages of the same type that can be deduced from KX .
This machinery implements the ability of X to interfere with communications
between the orchestrator and the system.
Finally, the knowledge of the intruder is always augmented with the mes-
sages that are exchanged between the orchestrator and the system, unless
the used channel is in H. Rationale is that the intruder can eavesdrop such
communications in order to acquire new information.
4.1 Example
In this section, we first present the PaMoChSA 2012 specification of the
example introduced in Section 2.2. Then, we show the output from a run of
the tool, presenting the synthesis of a secure orchestrator able to coordinate
the user, the booking service, and the insurance service in a functional and
secure way.
In our running example, the functional goal of the orchestrator is to
deliver an insured ticket, while its secure goal is to let the ticket a se-
cret not falling into the intruder’s knowledge. Below, we show an input
file describing our running example. The file format comprises tags de-
limiting the input parameters. The specification of the system is writ-
ten in a slight variant of Crypto-CCS. The language is typed. In partic-
ular, the type EKey for messages representing cryptographic keys denotes
public keys, while the type DKey denotes private keys. Even if the lan-
guage is quite intuitive, the interested reader can find more notions on this
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variant on the first version of the PaMoChSA manual, available online at
http://www.iit.cnr.it/node/16284.
<GOAL> insured_ticket : Insured </GOAL>
<ORCH_KNOWLEDGE> k_ins : EKey ;
k_u : DKey; k_u : EKey </ORCH_KNOWLEDGE>
<FORMULA> ticket : Ticket </FORMULA>
<KNOWLEDGE> k_book : EKey; k_ins : EKey;
k_attack : EKey; k_attack : DKey </KNOWLEDGE>
<SPEC>
Parallel
(* User *)
Send(a, Encrypt(k_u: EKey, k_book : EKey)).
Send(a, Encrypt(money : Money, k_u : DKey).0
And
(* Booking service *)
Recv(c,ENC_K_U : Enc(EKey * EKey)).
If Deduce (K_U = Decrypt(ENC_K_U,k_book : DKey)) Then
Recv(c,ENC_MONEY : Enc(Money * DKey)).
If Deduce (MONEY = Decrypt(ENC_MONEY,K_U)) Then
Send(c,Encrypt(ticket : Ticket, K_U)).0
End Deduce
End Deduce
And
(* Insurance service *)
Recv(d, ENC_TICKET : Enc(Ticket * EKey)).
If Deduce (TICKET =
Decrypt(ENC_TICKET,k_ins : DKey)) Then
Send(d,insured_ticket : Insured).0
End Deduce
15
End Parallel
</SPEC>
The tags in the input file describe the information necessary to synthesize
an orchestrator. The tag formula introduces the typed message that should
not be learned by the intruder (in our case, the ticket). The tag goal contains
the final “success” message (in this case, the insured ticket). The terms in
the Orch Knowledge tag represent the typed messages that the orchestrator
knows initially. In our running example, the initial knowledge of the orches-
trator contains the public key of the insurance service, kins, and both the
public and private key of the user. Especially since it knows said private key,
in this example the orchestrator is considered a trusted party that acts on
behalf of the user. Indeed, this is not necessarily the case. The terms in the
knowledge tag represent the typed messages that the intruder knowns at the
beginning of the computation, i.e., some public cryptographic keys (kbook and
kins), plus a pair of keys (kattack, k
−1
attack) owned by the intruder. Finally, the
spec tag introduces the specification of the known part of the system, i.e.,
the parallel composition of the user, plus the booking and insurance services.
Figure 4.1 shows the results of the elaboration. The tool correctly syn-
thesizes two secure orchestrators (basically, they represent the same process,
up-to a different order of execution). The orchestrator is a process that com-
municates with the user on channel a, forwarding messages to the booking
service on channel b. Then, it receives an encrypted ticket from the book-
ing service on channel b, decrypts the obtained message, encrypts the ticket
with the public key kins, and sends the result to the insurance service over
channel c. Thus, the insurance service is able to decrypt the ticket using
key (k−1ins) and to successfully issue the insured ticket, therefore fulfilling the
functional goal. The synthesised orchestrators are secure, in the sense that
their operations does not let a potential intruder learn the secret message
“ticket”.
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*** 2 orchestrators found:
Receive(a, Enc[booking_k](user_k) : Enc(EKey*EKey))
Receive(a, Enc[user_k](money) : Enc(Money*DKey))
Send(b, Enc[booking_k](user_k))
Send(b, Enc[user_k](money))
Receive(b, Enc[user_k](ticket) : Enc(Ticket*EKey))
Send(c, Enc[insurance_k](ticket))
Receive(c, insured_ticket : Insured)
Receive(a, Enc[booking_k](user_k) : Enc(EKey*EKey))
Send(b, Enc[booking_k](user_k))
Receive(a, Enc[user_k](money) : Enc(Money*DKey))
Send(b, Enc[user_k](money))
Receive(b, Enc[user_k](ticket) : Enc(Ticket*EKey))
Send(c, Enc[insurance_k](ticket))
Receive(c, insured_ticket : Insured)
*** Elapsed time: 0.008
Figure 4.1: Results: two secure orchestrators found.
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Chapter 5
Related work
In literature, there are some papers proposing compositional approaches to
the synthesis of controllers, able to dynamically enhance security, depending
on some runtime behaviour of a possible attacker, e.g., [9, 5].
The current work extends the existing research line on the synthesis of
secure controller programs [9] with the introduction of cryptographic prim-
itives. Also, it tries to simplify the approach in [6] for the synthesis of
deadlock-free orchestrators that are compliant with security adaptation con-
tracts [7]. The current method differs from [6], since the synthesis happens
in one step.
Similarly, our approach to synthesis differs from the one in [3], where au-
tomatic composition of services under security policies is investigated. Work
in [3] uses the AVISPA tool [14] and acts in two stages: first, it derives a
protocol allowing composition of some services; then, some desired security
properties are implemented. The latter step uses the functionality of AVISPA
and, for the former step, the desired composition is turned into a security
property, so that AVISPA itself can be used to derive an “attacker” which
actually is the orchestrator.
In [4], Li et al. present an approach for securing distributed adaptation.
A plan is synthesized and executed, allowing the different parties to apply
a set of data transformations in a distributed fashion. In particular, the
authors synthesize “security boxes” that wrap services, providing them with
the appropriate cryptographic capabilities. Security boxes are pre-designed,
but interchangeable at run time. Our approach, in contrast, lacks dynamic
planning. However, in our case the orchestrator is synthesized at run time
and is able to cryptographically arrange secure service composition.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
We have presented a theoretical approach and a tool for the synthesis of cryp-
tographic orchestrators that i) allows all the services to reach the expected
end of their operations without falling into a deadlock (livelock) status, and
ii) guarantee secrecy properties. The adoption of partial model checking
and satisfiability techniques, to automatically synthesize cryptographic or-
chestrators, extends the recent research line of [9] and [6]. The tool that
we implemented is an extension of the PaMoChSA system. In its original
version, the tool is a partial model checker able to find security attacks on
cryptographic protocols. The new version automatically synthesizes orches-
trators which are secure by construction. It will be interesting to adopt
the tool in real-world usage scenarios, by using concrete specification and
programming languages (e.g. BPEL) in place of Crypto-CCS.
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